Extensible, Fast And Secure Scala Expression Evaluation Engine

Submitted: 25th March 2017; accepted: 26th October 2017

Arkadiusz Janik, Roman Janusz

DOI: 10.14313/JAMRIS_3-2017/26

Abstract:

Scripting and expression evaluation engines are popular tools in the Java software ecosystem which is understood as any environment using Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to execute code (which does not have to be generated from Java language). With the current, wide-spread popularity of Java and Java bytecode compliant languages it means that both: traditional, stand-alone Java programs as well as enterprise systems run on application servers or even systems deployed in microservices architecture can be considered. Expression evaluation engines are often used for purposes like defining document templates, enhancing various static configuration formats with dynamically evaluated snippets or defining data binding for user interfaces. However, most of these solutions employ dynamically typed languages and suffer from limited performance and lack of any concern for security. This effectively makes it impossible to use expression language as a feature exposed to end users. This paper presents a novel approach to implementing an expression engine. It uses Scala as the expression language and leverages its static type system as well as its rich feature set to create an expression evaluation engine with expressive and concise language, high evaluation performance and fine-grained security control. In the paper we present use case built for the domain of telecommunication networks. In large telecommunication networks one can find hundreds of devices for which configuration has to be updated either periodically or on-demand when a given event occurs. Contents of configuration files may have to be generated dynamically (based on some data associated with a given device). On top of that, since telecommunication networks are heterogeneous environments with hardware delivered by different providers, exact form of each config file may vary depending on a type of a device and its manufacturer. Moreover, as structure and size of telecommunication networks evolve as new devices are added, there is a need to dynamically and remotely support completely new types of devices with a completely new format of configuration. This paper presents how the problem can be solved by using configuration file templates with placeholders that would be filled by some data associated with a given device. Each template is an expression that evaluates to exact configuration file. Performance is crucial (due to size of network) and so is security: the solution should allow to control what kind of configuration and by whom may be applied to devices while still allowing network operators to use a Graphical User Interface to define (or redefine) configuration file templates.

Keywords: expression evaluation engine, Scala

1. Introduction

Embedding scripting environments inside larger software systems is a commonly used technique where the system serves as a container for some specialized, domain specific logic that can be loaded and executed dynamically. Such environments allow implementing features that cannot be expressed by simple graphical interfaces without losing much of fine-grained control and generality provided by a scripting language.

Perhaps the most ubiquitous example of such a system is any web browser: The scripting language that it embeds is of course JavaScript and the browser serves as an execution environment for scripts.

Embedded scripting enables dynamic loading and execution of entire programs. A more lightweight and limited version of scripting engine is an expression evaluation engine. Instead of scripts that can be long and complex, an expression engine allows only simple expressions to be evaluated, with no access to constructs like loops, definitions of functions or classes, etc. Expressions usually consist of method or function invocations and operator applications that operate on expression input and produce some output data. Therefore, unlike script execution, expression evaluation is usually not allowed to cause any side effects.

One of the most challenging aspects of embedded scripting and expression evaluation engines is security. Loading and executing code provided dynamically by some third party poses a serious threat of letting malicious program execute which could result in either damage to the host system or unauthorized access to sensitive data. The more freedom a scripting engine allows, the harder it is to secure it. An expression engine is much easier to secure than a full-blown embedded scripting engine like browser-embedded JavaScript.

A good example of an expression evaluation use case is an expression-enhanced administrative panel. Such panel may be used, for example, to adjust a greeting message that is displayed to users upon logging into a web portal. The message would be configured as an expression (template) that has access to the data of the user logging in.

Another example could be an administrative interface for massive data processing system where a user could dynamically specify a data crunching job to be executed on a large amount of potentially distributed
data (e.g. a map-reduce job). An expression would define actual transformations performed on that data.

The domain that authors of this paper focused on when building the real-life use case, though, is telecommunication networks where there is a need to update configuration of network devices (or provide configuration of newly added devices) in some situations such as device reconfiguration, device decommissioning, network topology change etc. The proposed solution has been successfully used to built a device management platform that allows telco operators to monitor and manage devices installed in their networks. As mentioned above the system has to work in network with virtually unlimited number of devices. The devices can be automatically or manually grouped into hierarchies so that it is possible to manage them in bulk but still allowing fine-grained differences between configurations if required. Network devices have to be reconfigured remotely and it can be easily done with configuration files periodically fetched by devices from management systems. As part of configuration content is attributes (or metadata) of a given device, configuration file templates can be used. In other words: each template is an expression that evaluates to a configuration file. In order to adapt to changing topology of a network and to be able to support new types of devices with a new format of configuration files there is a need to provide a user interface to network operators allowing them to define new formats dynamically. The system guarantees a fine-grain security control over information that can/cannot be defined in the template.

The evaluation engine built is part on an internal scripting language that has to be flexible as both: format of configuration expected by a given device as well as output format used by a given device can vary but should be unified for end-user experience. By end-user we understood network administrators with some technical background. The evaluation engine allows them to (re)adjust the system for needs of a given customer without rebuilding and redeploying the system.

This paper describes an attempt to create an expression engine running on the JVM that is good for use cases like the ones described above. More systematically, the essential requirements for such engine are:
- very high evaluation performance - a single expression, compiled once, is likely to be evaluated massively, for many inputs
- fine grained security control - ability to easily reject potentially dangerous expressions by limiting what constructs and what API can be used
- flexibility and extensibility of the expression language

All of these requirements have a common denominator: to allow the expressions to be dynamically provided in runtime by means of graphical (e.g. administrative) interfaces without fear of security breaches and performance bottlenecks.

The research described in the paper allowed authors to build a domain-specific language in Scala (that was used to define allowed language syntactical constructs and calls to control and limit evaluations in terms of security) and to build a real-life, working and commercially used system that utilizes the evaluation engine to remotely manage devices in telecommunication networks.

2. Related Work

The paper [19] presents the algorithm for evaluating physical expressions and performing automatic conversions between quantities measured in different physical units. The paper describes CellML - the XML-based modelling language that can be used to represent units and expressions in a way that allows their easy validation and unit conversion. The authors described the two phases, partial evaluation algorithm. The solution, although very interesting cannot be used in our research as it only provides a part of required features. It proposes checking physical units at the level of the modelling language, removing the need for the support in the programming language. Also - due to a nature of the solution - security problems are not addressed at all. Similarly, although [23] presents a novel approach to interpretation for abstract equations using table-driven pattern matching it does not address security problems and cannot be used to evaluate general expressions.

An interesting idea to build an expression evaluation engine is to use XQuery as a base and one of available XQuery engines as the execution environment. This could be achieved directly in Java - for instance by using XQuery Processor for Java solution. The paper [20] presents XQuery as a very convenient expression evaluation engine. The paper summarizes non-standard applications of XQuery - using it to solve recreational problems and puzzles or - speaking more generally - using it as a problem-solving language.

A special case of an evaluation engine is regular expression searching engine. A regular expression can be understood as a domain specific language (DSL) that has to deal with text-parsing. There is a variety of engines available for Java platform. FIRE/J is one of them [21]. What makes the solution unique is its speed. According to the authors of the publication their solution is the fastest one which is one of goals of our project. FIRE/J has a major limitation, though. It’s developed as a tool for direct code generation. FIRE/J transforms each regular expression into a class file that is tailored specifically for the expression. As a result the solution cannot be used to provide a real, run-time expression evaluation engine. Regular expression evaluation engine is also a part of [29]. Even though the main subject of the paper is improving efficiency on spam filtering techniques some ideas presented may be useful in the broader context of evaluation engines. The paper focuses on evaluating regular expressions in a fast and efficient way. Despite of a lack of support for general expressions, the solution focuses on C/C++ platform.

Although the major subject of the paper [30] is
combining textual and visual programming by displaying Python and Java objects in a visual way some ideas presented could be utilized in the general concept of evaluation engine. Extending the evaluation engine so that it allows a user to specify the expression as a combination of text (expression code) and visual constructs may improve the user experience. One of test cases presented summarizes a visual editor of regular expressions. Nevertheless, the paper focuses on Visual Programming Languages (VPL) thus making it only partially useful in the context of our research.

Another example of a special case of expression evaluation engine is a database query engine. The good description of an algorithm for evaluating database queries is described in [22]. Queries are represented as expressions in a logical language. The recursive algorithm computes values of (sub)expressions in such a way that re-evaluation is avoided. To increase performance additional techniques are used such as transformations of the input expression. Although the performance of the proposed algorithm is high the solution focuses on a database queries only. Moreover, it does not describe the whole engine. Security aspect - due to a nature of queries - is not addressed, neither.

Another example of research done on building efficient query engines is presented in [28]. What constitutes the research particularly interesting for our work is Scala language that has been selected to implement LegoBase - a query engine being analysed by authors. The paper is part of abstraction without regret manifesto. Authors claim that database query compilers should allow both: productivity (by using high-level languages) and high performance. It means that developers should not be forced to use low-level abstraction to program database management systems in order to obtain high performance. The approach taken by authors is to use Scala (which means: a high-level language) which is then optimized to optimized, low-level C code for each SQL query. Authors used Scala to emit C code. Generative (meta)programming in Scala takes advantage of the type system of the language which ensures that abstractions such as generic data-structures or function calls are optimized away during code generation. Similar concept has been selected in our research: each evaluation is compiled to Java bytecode (.class), loaded to JVM and then instantiated. Such an instance is ready for evaluation.

As mentioned before a regular expression language is an example of a domain specific language (DSL), sometimes “little languages”. A DSL is a concise programming language designed to express in a clear way a small domain of problems. A particularly interesting case for our purposes is embedded DSL which lives inside a host language which allows developers to use existing language instead of learning a new syntax. The paper [24] addresses significant problem of such languages. As DSLs exist inside a general purpose language it is difficult for them to exploit domain knowledge. To deal with the problem there is a need for virtualizable languages - the ones that provide environment for embedded languages that guarantee embedded languages identical to corresponding stand-alone language implementations when it comes to safety, performance and expressiveness. The above mentioned paper mentions major safety problems related with language virtualization and DSL. However, the paper does not focus on safety thus not provide a solution.

The work presented in [24] was the initial survey of the area and has been continued by the team of Tiark Rompf and Hassan Chaﬁ later on. One of interesting applications of DSL is described in [25]. The work is driven by the need to support increasing size of datasets and limited amount of computational power. Authors propose an alternative to MATLAB: OptiML - a domain-specific language for machine learning. The major problem authors focused on is heterogeneous environment which, despite of lots of advantages requires researchers to have expert knowledge in different programming models (aimed at a specific component of a computing system: message passing libraries, thread libraries, data parallel programming models etc.). What makes this research particularly interesting is fact that OptiML is embedded in Scala. Its compiler is implemented in Scala so OptiML programs are also valid Scala programs. OptiML uses technique called lightweight modular staging to build an intermediate representation of a program. Several static and dynamic optimization techniques are used including pattern rewriting, fusing best effort computing or relaxed dependencies. Authors focus on performance aspect of the problem but security control is beyond the scope of the research.

It has to be underlined that significant difference between our research and OptiML is OptiML’s dependency on Scala-Virtualized [26]. Scala-Virtualized is a branch of the Scala compiler and standard library that contains a few additions to provide even better support for embedded DSLs. The major contribution is overloadable control structures (while-loops, if-then-else, pattern matching), variables, object creation, etc. In Scala-Virtualized concept of translating-for-comprehensions into method calls (to allow a programmer to change the meaning of a for-comprehension by implementing these methods in a required way) has been generalized to all control flow operators.

An extremely interesting and practical application of Lightweight Modular Staging is Lancet - a Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler framework for a Java bytecode [27]. Traditional JIT compilers use rather simple statistics to determine piece of code to be compiled (such as a number of a method’s calls) and use speculative (“optimistics”) inlining decisions (which means that later on, during program’s execution the method call may resolve to a different target thus forcing JIT compiler to deoptimize compiled code and compile/inline again). What Lancet adds on top of techniques used by modern JIT compilers is “access” to many other information that could be exploited runtime. Mixing DSL-expressions in a more general program allows explicit compilation and compile-time computation. Expli-
cit (on-demand) compilation is utilized by invoking JIT compilation directly by programs which gives an possibility to relay warning (or error) messages to the program. That, combined with several techniques of code optimization (namely controlled inlining, dead code elimination and aggressive partial evaluation) allows the compiler to guarantee (in same cases) that the part of compiled code will never allocate objects on the heap. As a result, that part of code can excluded from garbage collector's tracking. Compile-time computation is a technique that allows JIT compiler to call back into the running program. In other words, the JIT compiler is provided access to a "context" - proper "smart" library provided by a programmer of an application allows smart, domain-specific compilation optimizations. Even though the goal of authors - more efficient, better native code generated by JIT compilers - is beyond the scope of our work some concepts presented in the above mentioned paper have been included into our research. For instance SyntaxValidator trait implements similar logic to a part of Lancet called "taint-analysis" which tracks what happens to user input. It is assumed that input is tainted and validation is performed to check whether the tainted data is "leaked" to branched part of code etc.

**Dedicated Expression Engines**

JVM has a significant number of expression evaluation engine implementations. In this article, particular three are of our interest:
- Java Unified Expression Language (JUEL) [1]
- Spring Expression Language (SpEL) [2, ch.8]
- MVEL Expression Language (MVEL) [3]

JUEL is an implementation of the Unified Expression Language standardized as a part of JSR-245 specification - Java Server Pages [4]. In JSP and JSF (Java Server Faces [6], its successor) an expression language is used mostly as a data binding layer between a web interface and an underlying business layer. Expressions are embedded inside JSP/JSF pages to specify what data various UI components link to. This is a good example of a template-based user interface development, where a web page is a template that has some "holes" that need to be filled in concrete context by an expression evaluation.

SpEL is an expression language used by the Spring Framework [2], primarily for enhancing configuration of application components (called beans) in the IoC (Inversion of Control) container. In particular, expressions can be embedded in XML files that configure beans or inside Java annotations in source code of application components. This allows setting dynamic values to various configuration properties that can’t be expressed by simple literal values.

MVEL is a general purpose expression engine with a hybrid dynamically-statically typed language and an optional compilation to JVM bytecode which significantly improves performance.

The three listed expression engines use mostly dynamically typed, ad-hoc, simple expression languages.

JUEL and SpEL were designed to be used in static resources of applications that use them. None of the three engines have any security features or means of easily achieving it.

**Expression Engine on Top Existing Language**

Perhaps the most well known specification of an embedded scripting engine on the JVM is the JSR-233 standard, Scripting for the Java Platform [5]. It specifies standard data types and interfaces that must be provided by an engine that allows dynamic script execution inside a running JVM program. This standardized API primarily defines the way that host a program can communicate with an embedded script - a glue layer. It is agnostic of the actual scripting language.

There is a vast amount of JSR-233 implementations for many standalone programming languages as well as custom, ad-hoc scripting languages. These include Java, JavaScript, Groovy, Scala, Ruby, Python, PHP, etc.

An JSR-233 scripting engine could be used as a basis for an expression engine providing that there is a way to limit the scripting language to simple expressions with proper security enforcement. The standard itself does not define any means to achieve that, but concrete implementations and the scripting language that they use may have such capability.

If a programming language has a standalone interpreter or compiler to JVM bytecode that by itself also runs under JVM, it could be used directly instead of relying on a JSR-233 implementation.

In general, suitability of an JSR-233 implementation or a standalone compiler for implementing an expression evaluation engine depends heavily on traits of the language itself. Since the new expression engine targets the JVM, we are only considering languages that have a JVM implementation. Also, requirements for evaluation performance and ability to statically analyze expression code suggest that languages with at least some form of static typing should more easily meet these requirements than dynamically typed languages.

Three languages have been chosen for evaluation in this paper:
- Java [7] - statically typed but verbose and inflexible in many aspects
- Groovy [9] - concise and flexible in many ways, mostly dynamically typed (static typing as an option)
- Scala [8] - statically typed, with conciseness and flexibility potentially on par with dynamically typed languages thanks to type inference and other features

Scala and Groovy are normally languages compiled to JVM bytecode, but this does not mean there’s no point in them supporting JSR-233. The point of JSR-233 is not just interoperability with JVM objects but dynamic, embedded execution without need for explicit compilation and deployment.
3. Language Comparison

In order to choose a programming language that could serve as a basis of an expression evaluation engine, we must recognize what features in detail should the expression language provide. The new expression engine should be considered as a potential replacement or alternative to already existing engines and therefore should support most of expression language constructs that these engines provide.

More in-depth research on engines mentioned earlier (JUEL, MvEL, SpEL) as well as a closer look on general purpose programming languages that could be a basis for the new expression engine reveals the following set of commonly supported constructs:

- essential constructs: literals, constants, arithmetic and logical operators
- variable assignments and references
- function and method calls
- class instantiation
- operators for concise access to array, list and map elements (like square brackets for array access in Java)
- concise syntax for array, list and map creation
- field references and assignments
- anonymous functions (lambdas)
- basic higher-order functions for collections like filtering and transformation
- automatic type coercion
- null-safe dereference, e.g. the .? operator in Groovy [10].

Example: expression obj.?field will evaluate to null when obj is null instead of failing with an exception.

- default value operator (e.g. Groovy Elvis - ?: [11])

Makes it possible to concisely provide a fallback value that should be used when another value is null. Example: obj.name ?: "unknown"

- conditional expressions (e.g. ternary operator ?: in Java)
- structural and imperative constructs (loops, if-else etc.)
- template expressions - string literals with "holes" that will be filled by actual expressions.

An example of a template expression in SpEL (see [2, p.189]): My name is ${person.name} where person is the input object containing a property name.

- standard C/C++ and Java like syntax for function and method invocations and operators (this excludes Lisp or Haskell like languages)

The features listed above are only the purely syntactical constructs used by the end user who will actually write expressions. However, there is also a set of additional features that are important for the programmer who sets up the expression evaluation context. In particular, he/she must be able to influence how expressions in concrete context are compiled and evaluated and what constructs, API and types are available to the author of expressions. In detail, these features include:

- ability to define what top-level functions and objects are available in the expression
- pluggable strategies for implementing dynamic object property access and method calls
- enhancing API of existing types, e.g. by adding additional methods to standard data types like strings
- limiting the API of well-known types only to a desired set of methods, fields, etc.
- defining additional automatic type conversions
- custom operators and operator overloading
- ability to statically (during expression compilation) analyze the expression code and reject potentially unsafe or forbidden constructs and invocations

JUEL, MvEL and SpEL engines as well as the languages Java, Groovy and Scala were all verified in detail if features mentioned above are supported by them in any form. Table 1 summarizes the results of this research.

As we can see, Scala and Groovy seem to be the most promising. They have most of the language features required for an expression engine and they are the only two technologies with possibility of static expression code analysis, which is probably the most important requirement for the new expression engine considering its need for security enforcement.

Additionally, after more detailed analysis, Scala seems to be the winning option over Groovy since the latter is severely limited in its static analysis capabilities by dynamic typing. Although it is possible to force static typing in Groovy and obtain some type information during compilation (by means of Groovy’s ASTTransformation feature), this cripples other language features like dynamic method calls or ability to enhance API of existing types.

Adding language features and extensibility mechanism listed in Table 1 to already existing languages would be a non-trivial task requiring probably creating a fork of each language and modifying their compilers/interpreters accordingly. Therefore, Scala is selected as the most suitable technology for implementing the extensible, fast and secure expression engine described in this article.

It is worth explaining how the constructs to be exposed in language comparison were chosen. Expression language is not meant to be a full programming language. In order to implement use cases like the one described in the paper (config file templates) we only need the ability to define relatively small, pure functions. For that, constructs like field/property selection, function/method/operator application, ‘if-else’ expressions, lambda expressions, literals and constants are sufficient. Expression engine will not be used...
to implement complex algorithms, side-effecting programs, low-level programs or large codebases. Therefore, there is no need to support language constructs like methods or classes, which are associated with code reuse, abstraction, modularity, readability and long-term maintenance. Supporting minimal, sufficient subset of language features also makes it way easier to secure the engine against exploits and write UI tools for syntax highlighting, suggestions, etc.

4. Scala as Expression Language

In this section we will present a quick overview of essential properties of the Scala programming language and discuss in detail how its various features are sufficient to meet requirements discussed earlier. See [12] and [13] for more complete overview of the language.

Scala [8] is a programming language for the JVM aiming to blend the object oriented and functional programming paradigms and retain good interoperability with Java. It is a statically typed language with type inference and very complex, fine-grained type system. At the same time it aims to be close in its conciseness and flexibility to dynamically typed programming languages.

Scala version 2.10 introduces important metaprogramming facilities - reflection and macros which are key for implementing security features of the expression engine.

Scala naturally supports essential constructs like constants, arithmetic expressions, object property access and method calls, constructors, etc. Expressions in Scala mostly have a syntax similar to Java. Differences include e.g. usage of square brackets instead of angle brackets to denote generic types. For example, `Arrays.<String>asList("str")` in Java becomes `Arrays.asList[String]("str")` in Scala (the type can however be usually omitted due to type inference).

In Scala, there is no clear difference between a method and an operator. Every operator can be though as if it’s a method with a symbolic name. At the same time every method which takes exactly one argument can be called with an infix syntax. All of the following constructs are correct:

\[ 1 + 2 \]
An unique feature of Scala is an ability to define implicit conversions [12, ch.15] between types. In an expression evaluation engine, this can be used for two purposes:
- to provide custom automatic type coercion
- to enhance API of existing types with new methods, fields, etc.

The API enhancing is possible thanks to the so called implicit views. By introducing an implicit conversion from type A to type B we effectively enhance API of A with API of B. Methods in type B become extension methods of type A. This is often realized in Scala using a syntactic sugar called implicit classes.

The following example enhances type String with an additional capitalize method:

```scala
implicit class richStr(str: String) {
  def capitalize = str(0).toUpperCase + str.substring(1)
}
```

It is worth noting that extension method can also be called with an infix syntax, so it is effectively possible to create and overload operators.

Scala also has a number of syntactic sugars that increase conciseness. For example, when a method is called apply, it can serve as an overloaded function application operator, i.e. obj.apply[arg] can be rewritten just as obj[arg]. Thanks to this, we can have concise collection creation constructs like:

```scala
List(1, 2, 3, 4)
Array("str", null, "sth")
Map("one" -> 1, "two" -> 2)
```

The example above also uses a few other independent Scala features:
- variadic arguments (the apply method takes a variable number of arguments of the same type)
- first-class objects (List, Array and Map are actually singletons associated with their corresponding collection types - so called companion objects)
- type inference (the apply methods on objects List, Array and Map are generic)
- custom operators (the -> is a custom operator that creates a pair out of its operands)

The apply method can also be used to implement concise access to collection elements, e.g. `someList(2), someMap("key")`.

It is important to remember that implicit conversions are resolved statically, based on types known at compile-time (unlike type coercions in JUEL/SpEL/MVEL which use runtime type information).

Scala is a functional language, so it naturally supports constructs like lambda expressions and higher order functions. Examples:
a statically typed arguments and a static return type. So this feature cannot be used to somehow introduce dynamic typing into Scala.

5. Metaprogramming in Scala

Metaprogramming is the method used by Scala-based expression engine to enforce security of evaluated expressions. Therefore it deserves a separate overview in this article.

Scala Compiler Metaprogramming techniques in Scala are heavily related to internal architecture of the Scala compiler. Therefore we will briefly describe the compilation process and data types used by the compiler to represent various entities in compiled programs. These data types are also exposed by the reflection API, which is used in both runtime reflection and macros (described later).

A compiler run consists of several phases [14]. Each phase takes as an input the output of the previous phase. In most cases, that input and output is the abstract syntax tree (AST) of the program. Each phase performs some modifications and refinements on the AST. In total, there is about 30 phases. Phases can be divided logically into two stages, according to a standard, generic architecture of compilers:

- Stage of analysis is responsible for extracting as much information as possible from the textual source code and transforms it into canonical intermediate representation ready to be compiled into JVM bytecode. The most important phases of analysis are the parser, namer and typer. Parser transforms the textual code into an initial AST. Namer is responsible at least for resolution of imports and types - the most complex and time consuming phase - performs the typechecking of the code.
- Stage of synthesis gradually transforms the AST into more raw forms, closer to the final representation which is ultimately translated into JVM bytecode. It contains several phases which are not of an interest in this article.

The compiled program is represented inside the compiler primarily by three types of objects which refer to each other:

- Tree is a representation of abstract syntax tree that is an input and output of most of the phases. Trees have immutable, hierarchical structure and mutable attributes. The structure of the tree heavily depends on what phase is being executed. For example, a tree just after parsing is closest in its structure to textual source code - no syntactic sugars have not yet been expanded, no types inferred, no implicit conversions applied, etc. The tree is still closest to its textual form in this phase because things like import resolution, type inference and implicit resolution have not been performed yet. On the other hand, all of this information is explicitly represented in the tree after it exists the typechecker phase.
- Type is a representation of every Scala data type. Types are one of the attributes associated with most of the trees after they are typechecked. Types have a rich API which, among other things, makes it possible to inspect what members are available on various types or perform operations like type conformance tests.
- Symbol objects represent various entities found in the source code. For example, each variable, method, class, object, etc. has a symbol. Symbols are divided into two subcategories - term symbols (values, variables, objects, etc.) and type symbols (classes, traits, abstract types, type aliases, etc.). Symbols are also associated with most of the trees after typechecking. For example, a tree representing a method invocation will have the symbol of the method being invoked associated with it.

Reflection and Macros Trees, types and symbols are not only used by the compiler internally, but they are also exposed by the Scala reflection API [15]. This API is used by two metaprogramming facilities in Scala - runtime reflection and macros.

Runtime reflection [17] allows a programmer to work with trees, types and symbols in runtime, as the name suggests. It is possible to obtain types and symbols for runtime objects and extract various information from it.

Macros [16] are a form of compile time metaprogramming in Scala. A macro is a special declaration in the Scala source code which is syntactically similar to a regular method. The difference between a macro and a method is that while a method works in runtime - on values of its arguments and returns some other value - a macro is invoked during compilation and takes as its input and output a Tree for each argument. It can inspect these trees and modify them before returning a final tree that will replace the macro invocation and eventually be compiled to JVM bytecode. Macros are expanded inside the typechecker phase. This means that the trees that macros work on carry maximum information, including types and symbols. Macros can also trigger compilation errors during their expansion.

Macros are the key feature for implementing security in a Scala based expression evaluation engine. They effectively allow a static analysis of expression code which can inspect what language constructs are being used in an expression being compiled and what methods are being invoked by it. Upon detection of a forbidden construct or invocation, the macro can simply trigger a compilation error.

6. Scala Expression Engine Implementation

This section describes the core API of the Scala expression evaluation engine as well as gives more details about the underlying implementation.

Essential Components and Types The central component of the Scala expression engine is the ScexCompiler object. It encapsulates the actual Scala
The expression compilation has the following signature:

```scala
def getCompiledExpression[C <: ExpressionContext[_, _]: TypeTag, T: TypeTag](
  profile: ExpressionProfile,
  expression: String,
  template: Boolean = true,
  header: String = "") : Expression[C, T]
```

The types used in above signature and other API elements are:
- `TypeTag` is a type from Scala runtime reflection API. The syntax `T: TypeTag` denotes that method `getCompiledExpression` will have access to runtime information about type `T`.
- `Expression[C, T]` is a function that takes an expression context (type `C`) as an input and returns some arbitrary value of type `T`. This is what we understand as expression evaluation.
- `ExpressionContext[R, V]` is the input of the expression and serves two purposes:
  - It encapsulates the root object of the expression - an object of arbitrary type `R` whose API is directly exposed to be used by expression code. Root object is also de facto the actual input data of the expression.
  - It serves as a container for variables of an arbitrary type `V` which can be accessed inside the expression.
- `ExpressionProfile` customizes the way expression is compiled. The profile consists of:
  - `SymbolValidator` defines language structures that are allowed to be used by the expression.
  - `SyntaxValidator` defines which methods can be invoked and which fields can be accessed for particular types.
  - Expression header - code that will be compiled along each expression. Header is primarily used to provide import clauses for expression code.
  - `ExpressionUtils` - implementation of additional API that can be used inside expressions. This can be used to implement some API in Scala in situation when application using the expression evaluation engine is by itself written in Java.

Symbol validator and syntax validator are the core components performing static analysis of expressions and security enforcement. The way they are created and configured will be described in more detail later in this paper.
- The template parameter controls whether an expression is compiled as a template expression.
- The header parameter provides additional header that will be compiled in expression code. Its purpose is similar to the header specified in expression profile, but can be different for each expression that uses the same profile.

### Compilation Process

Expression Compilation is Performed in the Following Steps:

1. `ExpressionDef` object is created. This intermediate object contains full information about how the expression should be compiled, what the expression code is and what are the input and output types.
2. `ExpressionDef` object is optionally preprocessed. Preprocessing may include any modification of expression definition (e.g. additional pre-translation of code)
3. Expression code is wrapped into a proper Scala source file that contains the expression class implementing `ExpressionTrait`. The bare expression code is wrapped into an invocation of security-enforcing macro.
4. Source file is passed into the Scala compiler for actual compilation.
5. During type phase, the security-enforcing macro is expanded. The macro uses syntax validator and symbol validator to analyze expression code for forbidden constructs and invocations.
6. Expression class is compiled into JVM bytecode and `.class` files are generated.
7. Expression class is loaded into the JVM, instantiated and returned as a compiled expression.

### Configuration of Validators

As described earlier, the programmer can decide what language constructs and invocations can be used inside expression code by providing a `SyntaxValidator` and a `SymbolValidator` instance through `ExpressionProfile`. This section describes how these two components are configured.

```scala
import scala.reflect.macros.Universe

trait SyntaxValidator {
  def validateSyntax(u: Universe)(tree: u.Tree): (Boolean, List[u.Tree])
}
```

The tree is a fully typechecked tree representing the expression code. Since it contains type information, it may be used for much deeper validation than just syntax validation. However, validation of types and symbols is much more complex in its implementation and was done as a separate component - the symbol validator. Syntax validator is intended to be used to look for forbidden syntactic constructs, like definitions or loops. Such validation can be easily implemented using pattern matching on particular cases of trees. This is what is usually done inside the `validateSyntax` method.

The `validateSyntax` method returns a pair that denotes whether the tree passed the validation and
a list of children trees that need to be validated next. This way syntax validation descends through the entire expression tree.

By default, the expression engine provides a standard implementation of a syntax validator that allows only simple expressions to be used. This includes constants, identifiers, method calls, operator applications, lambda expressions, conditional statements, simple blocks and constructor invocations. No assignments, declarations, definitions or loops are allowed.

Symbol validator is much more complex to implement and requires some more convenient configuration layer to avoid dealing with raw trees.

In order to create an instance of SymbolValidator, the programmer needs to provide an ACL-like structure (Access Control List). In a program using Scala expression engine, this ACL is represented by type List[MemberAccessSpec]. Each element, a MemberAccessSpec instance either allows or denies usage of some symbol (method, field or constructor, including methods visible through implicit views) on a particular type. In detail, the MemberAccessSpec contains following information:

- information about the type
- signature of the member of that type that is being denied or allowed by this element
- optional signature of implicit conversion that is used to obtain an implicit view that causes that member to be available on that type
- information about whether this element denies or allows usage of given symbol on given type

Symbol Validation DSL Instances of MemberAccessSpec and the ACL are not created by the programmer manually. Instead, a dedicated Scala DSL (domain specific language) has been created for that purpose. That DSL is an example of a technique called language virtualization, which essentially means to replace standard semantics of some language (in this context Scala) with some custom semantics, i.e. leverage syntax and type system of Scala for a different purpose than compilation of Scala program.

Language virtualization in symbol validation DSL is realized by another set of Scala macros, allow and deny. Each of these macros take a specific block of code (format described below) and generate code that evaluates to a part of the ACL. These parts can be later concatenated into a full ACL using standard Scala list concatenation operator ++.

The blocks being passed as inputs to allow and deny contain a references to scala types and their members that the programmer wants to allow or deny. References are represented as lambda expressions or simple method calls (i.e. lambda expressions and method calls are virtualized as references to symbols).

If a programmer wants to allow or deny usage of some static Java member or member of Scala toplevel object, the reference to that member is put directly into the block passed as input to allow or deny. If the programmer wants to allow or deny usage of a non-static member on some type, that reference must be additionally put inside an on statement which specifies the exact type on which the member is allowed or denied.

Simple example of ACL created with symbol validation DSL:

```scala
val acl = allow {
  String.valueOf(_: Int)
} ++ deny {
  on { obj: java.lang.Object =>
    obj.wait()
    obj.notify()
    obj.equals _
  }
}
```

In the example above, the acl value will have the type List[MemberAccessSpec] which can be concatenated with other ACL parts or eventually used to create a symbol validator. The above example allows usage of a static method valueOf that takes a single Int argument of a class java.lang.String and denies instance methods wait, notify and equals on type java.lang.Object.

As in all ACL-like structures, if more than one element in the ACL matches invocation that is being validated, the element earlier in the list has a priority over the latter one.

Symbol validator DSL also provides additional convenience constructs for allowing or denying the entire sets of members with single statements. Below is presented a comprehensive list of all available constructs in the DSL (examples are assumed to be inside allow or deny block):

- static members (explicitly)
  ```scala
  Integer.parseInt(_: String)
  ```

- instance members (explicitly) - either available directly or by an implicit view
  ```scala
  on { str: String =>
    str.substring(_)
    str.substring(_, _)
    str.toString()
  }
  ```

- all static members of some Java class
  ```scala
alldStatic[String].members
  ```

- all static members of some Java class with a given name
  ```scala
alldStatic[String].membersNamed.valueOf
  ```

- all members available on a given type
  ```scala
  on { str: String =>
    str.all.members
  }
  ```
This deliberately excludes members declared in top-level types Any and AnyRef, i.e. equals, hashCode, == etc. since they are available on all types (or all reference types) and it's not usually the intention of a programmer to include them.

- all members available on a given type with given name
  on { str: String =>
      str.all.membersNamed.substring
  }

- all members available on a given type declared in class representing that type
  on { str: String =>
      str.all.declared.members
  }

  This includes all members declared in that class directly and all members that this class overrides.

- all members available on a given type declared in a class representing that type and not inherited from supertypes
  on { str: String =>
      str.all.introduced.members
  }

  This includes all members declared in that class that don't override a member from superclass.

- all members available on a given type by an implicit view to some type
  on { str: String =>
      str.implicitlyAs[StringOps].all.members
  }

- a single constructor for a given type
  new java.util.Date

- all constructors for a given type
  on { str: String =>
      str.all.constructors
  }

- all bean getters, bean setters, scala getters or scala setters available on a given type
  on { jb: SomeJavaBean =>
      jb.all.beanGetters
      jb.all.beanSetters
  }

  on { sc: ScalaClass =>
      sc.all.scalaGetters
      sc.all.scalaSetters
  }

Con structs listed above can be freely combined to form more complex patterns, e.g.

on { o: SomeType =>
    o.implicitlyAs[OtherType].all.introduced.beanGetters
}

### Detailed Security Analysis

Syntax and symbol validators provide means to achieve tight security enforcement, but they must be used carefully and with full awareness of possible vulnerabilities. Every security feature protects only against some particular class of attacks. This section describes possible security vulnerabilities that could be exposed by expression engine and makes it clear which of them the Scala expression engine protects against. It also discusses which security problems must be addressed separately, in other layers of the software that uses an expression engine.

Exposing expressions to a malicious user could generally cause three types of security breaches:

- unauthorized access to sensitive data
- unauthorized access to operations that could damage or compromise the host system
- exhaustion of resources used by the host system or abnormally high utilization of these resources

All of these breaches could obviously be caused by exposing an expression API that is insecure by itself. It is a responsibility of the programmer/administrator to ensure that functions and operations that can be used in an expression are internally secure. If they aren’t, the engine itself has no way of knowing this, since it only uses compile-time information for validation. So the most basic rule of designing secure expression API is to make sure each exposed method is secure by itself.

However, sometimes it may not be obvious that some operation is insecure. For that reason, we give examples of common ways in which a member of expression API may become a security hole.

- Exposing toString()
  Allowing toString() calls is an easy way to leak sensitive information. The toString() method should only be allowed on simple data types that have an obvious implementation of toString(). Therefore, one should be extremely careful when allowing calling toString() on:

  - classes encapsulating something else than immutable data, e.g. some internal state
  - classes and interfaces that are a base of an open type hierarchy - even if the base type itself is secure, any of its subtypes may no longer be so
  - generic containers, e.g. collections

For example, allowing calling toString() on type List[Any] is an obvious security issue. List's toString() implementation internally calls toString() on its elements and the expression engine doesn’t know about it, because this information is not available in compile time. This effectively gives us access to results of toString() on any value that could be inside a list. List[Any]#toString() is therefore as insecure as Any#toString().

- Exposing API that internally uses toString()
  In any API which exposes toString()
tors which take arbitrary values as their arguments and call `toString()` on them internally. The `*` operator for concatenation of strings and arbitrary values is perhaps the most apparent example of such API. Therefore, when exposing these API fragments, one must be as careful as with the `toString()`

- Exposing untyped operations

It is highly recommended that the exposed expression API is as strongly, statically typed as possible. This way we have much more information to work with in compile time and we can be vastly more precise when defining security rules using symbol validator DSL.

- Exposing API with non-constant time or memory complexity.

This could lead to easy exhaustion of host system resources, especially considering the fact that expressions are meant to be evaluated massively, on multiple pieces of input data.

Even more dangerous than exposing methods with just non-constant (e.g. linear) complexity is exposing APIs with complexity determined by runtime values passed to them. For example, Scala standard library provides an `*` operator on the `String` class which takes an integer argument and replicates a string given number of times. Simply by passing a large integer value, e.g. "abc"*10000000, expression writer can easily cause allocation of very large amounts of memory.

Apart from securing the API itself, one must also take some measures to secure the syntax. Scala is a general-purpose programming language, but the Scala expression engine enables only a small portion of its syntactic constructs. This is done on purpose, to disallow elements which could easily exhaust resources of the host systems (e.g. loops). Although it is possible to provide custom syntax validator and allow more, it is highly recommended to stay with the predefined simple-expression syntax subset of Scala. In other words, we should keep the expression engine an `expression` engine and not make it a scripting engine, which is much harder to secure.

Exhaustivity of security heavily depends on the language constructs exposed. That’s why it’s important to keep them minimal. The simplest general example of an API secured with our evaluation expression would be exposing desired subset of some Java class and forbidding usage of common methods that could lead to information leaking (toString, concatenation with Strings, getClass, etc.) or low-level operations that could disrupt the entire process (wait, notify, etc.).

Finally, one must be aware that usage of CPU and memory during expression evaluation is at least proportional to the overall complexity of the expression. Therefore, some limits must be enforced in this area. For example, one may want to limit the textual length of an expression or maximum depth of its syntax tree. The latter case can be easily implemented with a custom syntax validator.

7. Usage Example

This section outlines a typical use case for Scala expression engine and explains how its features make it a viable solution that retains good performance and enforces tight security.

Dynamic Serving of Configuration Files

Scala expression engine could be used in a system for mass management and configuration of devices, e.g. telecommunication devices like routers. These devices usually require dynamic, remote reconfiguration. This may be easily done with configuration files periodically fetched by devices from the management system. However, contents of configuration files may need to be generated dynamically, based on some data associated with particular device asking for configuration. Additionally, the exact format of each config file may need to be different for various device types. Above all this, system operators may want to change the contents and structure of served configuration files on a regular basis, without reconfiguring and restarting the management system itself.

This problem can be easily addressed with an expression engine: operators could use some user interface to define `configuration file templates`. Each template may have placeholders that would be filled by some data associated with the device when that device asks for configuration file. In other words, each template would be an `expression` that evaluates to exact configuration file contents based on particular device data.

For example, let’s assume that the data associated with a device is represented by following Scala trait:

```scala
trait DeviceData {
  def id: String
  def currentIP: String
  def modelName: String
  def manufacturer: String
  def wifiSSID: String
  def wifiPassword: String
  def wifiEncryption: String
}
```

This data is either sent by the device when it asks for configuration file (e.g. current IP) or is stored in the system database (e.g. WiFi parameters to be set). It may also come from some external systems.

Let’s assume that we need to send configuration file to a group of home routers in order to setup the WiFi network. The configuration file format accepted by devices may look like this:

```javascript
[wifi]
ssid=homeWifi
password=secretPassword
encryption=WPA2
```

System operator could then define a template for such configuration file. This template would be a SCEX
expression that could look like below. This is assuming that the programmer has defined the expression API for this particular purpose to contain a value deviceData which is of type DeviceData.

```
[wifi]
ssid=${deviceData.wifiSSID}
password=${deviceData.wifiPassword}
encryption=${deviceData.wifiEncryption}
```

However, some types of devices may not accept the values in the same format as they are stored in the system database. For example, let’s assume that encryption mode saved in database is exactly “WPA2”, but the device accepts only lowercase “wpa2”. System operator can quickly define a separate template for this particular type of device and adjust to device behavior:

```
encryption=${deviceData.wifiEncryption.toLowerCase}
```

Thanks to the fact that an expression engine allows us to dynamically define small snippets of code, the operator has very detailed control over what exactly is being sent to devices. Also, since such strange issues may be very unpredictable, it is very hard to preconfigure the management system to handle all device types properly. The possibility of dynamic loading and redefinition of templates is very useful here.

Use case described above has all the important needs that SCEX addresses:
- templates (expressions) are defined and loaded dynamically
- templates are defined by system users, possibly using graphical interfaces - security enforcement is needed
- single template is typically evaluated and applied on large number of devices - evaluation performance is important

8. Performance

A set of performance tests was carried out to confirm that the evaluation of expressions in the new engine is comparable to performance of raw bytecode. The engine was compared with statically compiled Scala code and engines described earlier - JUEL, SpEL and MVEL. Also, a simple compilation performance test was carried out.

The purpose of tests is not to give any precise numeric coefficients since evaluation and compilation performance greatly depend on what kind of expressions are actually compiled and evaluated.

The tests consisted of a series of evaluations or compilations of expressions in a loop. Tables below present the results. The numbers are in milliseconds and serve only for comparison with each other:

Following configuration was used in the test case:
- processor Intel Core i7-3520M 2.90GHz
- Microsoft Windows 7 64bit
- Oracle JDK 8 update 20 64bit

9. Summary

We have presented a new approach to implementing an expression evaluation engine for the JVM. The key goals of that approach is high evaluation performance and secure compilation and evaluation of expressions so that they can be safely created by potentially malicious users, possibly using graphical system interfaces. These properties should not result in a less rich or flexible expression language than ones provided by existing solutions.

We have shown that already existing solutions, represented primarily by engines JUEL, SpEL and MVEL do not meet these requirements. We have also evaluated already existing, general purpose programming languages for suitability of building an expression engine on top of them. The language of choice was Scala. Its primary advantage over other languages is static type system which guarantees good performance and makes it possible to statically analyze code using macros, a compile metaprogramming facility. Despite being statically typed, Scala still retains much of the flexibility and conciseness of dynamically typed languages.

We have described how exactly Scala features can be leveraged for an expression language and presented a quick overview of its metaprogramming capabilities. Then we have outlined the most important elements of API and architecture of the new expression engine. As one of the most important elements, a DSL
for specifying what invocations are allowed inside expression code was presented in more detail.

Finally we have shown that the new expression engine meets its performance requirements by being comparable to statically compiled Scala code.

AUTHORS
Arkadiusz Janik – AGH University of Science and Technology, al. Mickiewicza 30, 30-059 Krakow, Poland, e-mail: arkadiusz.janik@agh.edu.pl.
Roman Janusz – AGH University of Science and Technology, al. Mickiewicza 30, 30-059 Krakow, Poland, e-mail: romeqjanoosh@gmail.com.
∗Corresponding author

REFERENCES

